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Diderot's relationship with mathematics is controversial, as he progressively 
denies their explanatory value without fully abandoning its practice. The 
main interpreters of his epistemology have considered that such a departure 
results from a formative fragility or a reorientation to the new fields of 
biology and chemistry. In this paper, differently, we seek to show that the 
reasons are of a philosophical kind, depending on how the notion of an 
ongoing scientific revolution determines the need to deactivate the henceforth 
outdated scientific paradigm and to seek for the epistemological conditions of 
the alternative that is already operating. 
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In an article titled “Diderot et le calcul des probabilités 
dans l‟Encyclopédie”, Jean Mayer summarized very precisely 
the complex relationship of Diderot with mathematics: “Despite 
the lasting fascination that mathematics have exerted on 
Diderot, we can say that they represent for him a disappointed 
ambition and that their role in his metaphysics remains 
precarious and circumscribed.” (Mayer 1991, 375, our 
translation) Diderot was not the only one defending a different 
hierarchy of the knowledges. It suffices to think of the 
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descriptive methodology followed by Buffon in his Natural 
History, based on the practice of observation and leaving for 
mathematics only the calculation of probable consequences of 
the facts. (Buffon 2007, 65-66) However, what is peculiar to him 
is the philosophical reach of that progressive distancing and an 
apparent indecision about the fitting place to attribute to them. 
That waiver of the mathesis universalis, in a time of consecration 
of the big mathematical models of modernity, by an author who, 
at the start of his journey, in Mémoires sur différents sujets de 
mathématiques (1748), seemed to be at ease with them, ended up 
converting it into an inevitable stopover for those who are 
dedicated to Diderot‟s epistemological perspective.  
For most contemporary interpreters, willing participants 
in a scientific paradigm based on mathematics as ours, that 
surprising deviation has referred to the knowledges, the 
competencies and the interests of Diderot himself. That‟s precisely 
the way Mayer deals with it, stating that “the conclusion is not 
discussed: a conscientious personal effort to deepen his training 
was not enough to make Diderot an original mathematician and 
he did not even understand the transformation brought by his 
contemporaries in this field.” (ibid. 376, our translation)  
More recently, François Pépin starts from this same 
conclusion, but raises the hypothesis that “the epistemological 
contrast that allows this criticism of mathematics corresponds to 
a redeployment of Diderot's scientific culture.” (Pépin 2012, 466-
67, our translation) Such a perspective allows him to overcome 
an interpretation based on Diderot‟s effective competencies in 
the domain of mathematics to take on an important incursion 
into the big philosophical problems produced by such devaluing. 
Nevertheless, the intent to demonstrate the relevance of the 
inflection for the recent experimental sciences, particularly for 
chemistry, overdetermined the global scope.  
Finding the full logic underlying the paradox requires, 
in our view, the complementary interpretive decision of 
handling the theme from a broader horizon. The idea of an on-
going scientific revolution appears to us as the key notion for a 
sustained explanation of such dramatic detour. This results 
from the evidence that at the centre of Diderot‟s reflections lays 
the sketching of a new epistemology, consequent with the 





declared feeling of participating “at the dawn of a great 
revolution in science”. (Diderot 1999, 37) In a letter of February 
19, 1758, addressed to Voltaire, he would confirm that 
appreciation for the sense of history: “the reign of 
mathematics is no more. Taste has changed. It is that of 
natural history and the letters that dominates”. (Diderot 1997, 
73, our translation) Seven years later, the memorial note on 
the dead of Alexis de Clairaut (1765) stresses once more that 
dynamics: “metaphysicians and poets had their time; 
systematic physicians succeeded them; experimental physics 
substituted systematic physics; geometry substituted 
experimental physics, natural history and chemistry, which 
are in vogue now and divide the spirits with politics, 
commerce and welfare matters, substituted geometry”. 
(Diderot 1981, 403, our translation) This recurrence, even in 
circumstantial texts, confirms the prominence of the concept of 
scientific revolution in Diderot‟s epistemology and makes it 
necessary to consider the new role assigned to mathematics as 
a significant piece in such all-over transformation.    
Therefore, we differ from the many interpreters that 
refer to the idea of a scientific revolution as the result of mere 
circumstantial judgement over what was fashionable at the 
time. Instead, we ascribe to the perspective of a scientific 
revolution the status of a conductive guideline that was 
mobilizing the ongoing methodological options in the Letter on 
the Blind for the use of those who can see (1749), consecrated in 
Thoughts on the interpretation of Nature (1753) and confirmed 
in subsequent texts. Moreover, we consider that the effects 
produced by the idea of a contemporary scientific revolution 
should make intelligible the crucial epistemological problems 
that the overcoming of the mathematical explanation entails, 
the sophisticated stratification of Diderot‟s critique aimed at 
them, and, no less important, the argumentative strategy 
followed by the philosopher. To achieve this hermeneutical 
perspective, we shall privilege what texts imply concerning 
Diderot‟s critique, rather than some biographical approach or 
the recurrent, but inconsistent, opposition between rationalist 
and empiricist partisanship. 
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2. The Baconian Reception 
This reading of a radical and indisputable mutation, 
taking place in the present, but opening to a peculiar future, 
also limits the range of the successive historiographic attempts 
to redirect Diderot‟s proposal to a mere resume of the essential 
of Francis Bacon‟s philosophy of knowledge. In general, it 
becomes noticeable that the reception of Bacon‟s legacy follows 
a double intentionality indicating a sort of permanent 
translation exercise. (Adams 1999, 20) First, it figures as a 
learning process of the paths leading to the order of knowledge 
in construction, as far as “this extraordinary genius, unable to 
make the history of what we knew, did the one of what should 
be learn”. (Diderot 1994, 215, our translation) Second, Bacon‟s 
project is like a disruptor of the Cartesian predominant, whilst 
it identifies with an alternate possibility at the core of 
Modernity, one for whom mathematics had only an ancillary 
role, in face of metaphysics and physics. In both cases, 
nevertheless, in no way does it exhausts the field of future 
epistemology, to deserve its straightforward reproduction.  
Such strategy also reveals that, differently from Bacon 
whose “account is perfunctory, passing over the already 
substantial achievements made in the sixteenth century”, 
(Bacon 2008, 583) as Brian Vickers puts it, his is self-conscious 
as well of the century realisations as of the main reason to 
consider that sense of a changeover to a “second Modernity”.  
In particular, the way he transforms Bacon‟s 
considerations on mathematics shows an active, but parodic 
and deviant reception of the British model. For instance, he 
eventually took on Bacon‟s suggestion in The Advancement of 
Learning that it would be “more agreeable to the nature of 
things and to the light of order to place it [Mathematics] as a 
branch of Metaphysics” (Bacon 2008, 199) to convert it in the 
idea of an idealistic metaphysical inner characteristic of 
mathematics. Such detour also involves the way he doesn‟t 
follow Bacon‟s ontological view of science based on inner 
natures, but nevertheless ascribes to mathematics such 
dependence of ontology or the way he converts Bacon‟s praise of 
“quantity determined or proportionable” as “one of the 
Essential Forms of things” (Bacon 2008, 199-200) into a critique 





of mathematics‟ formality. Therefore, he returns to the 
Baconian idea that mathematics are subsidiary to the task of 
interpreting nature, but converts what, in the predecessor, 
constituted a generalist consideration into a circumstantiated 
critical exercise with two complementary purposes. On one side, 
he is committed to show why the epistemological model based 
in mathematics is exhausted. On the other side, he assumes the 
task of setting the guidelines for the recently arising one, 
including the structural conditions of the worldview that it 
requires.  
 
3. Scientific Revolution and History of the Sciences         
The argumentation follows, in Thoughts, two main lines. 
First, it is about showing that mathematics reached the limit of 
the possible knowledge for its sphere of research; second, it is 
concerned with establishing that the characteristic explanatory 
model of mathematics, even having reached a definitive degree 
of completion, is not valid for the interpretation of nature.  
Diderot stands by the idea that the sciences and the arts 
are human activities, having, therefore, a history in relation 
with the history of humanity, understood as an alternation of 
periods of darkness and light, and with the history of the 
individuals that cultivate them, imposing their personal limits. 
That theory of history presupposes, for each science, a long 
interval between the moment of its birth and the culmination 
point, which, once reached, produces the justifying criterion of a 
revolution. The Encyclopédie‟s article “Encyclopédie” states it: 
“revolutions are necessary; there have always been revolutions 
and always will be; the greatest interval from one revolution to 
another is known: this cause alone limits the extension of our 
work. There is a point in the sciences beyond which it is almost 
beyond their ability to go. When that point is reached, the 
achievements that remain of that advance are forever a marvel 
to the entire species.” (Diderot & d‟Alembert, 2007)  
Therefore, the history of each science reproduces the 
universal game between obscurity and illumination: a period, in 
which a certain science reaches a maximum of evidence, after a 
period of ignorance, ends up followed by a progressive opacity 
until it becomes cryptic, with a degree of incomprehension that 
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Diderot links to the hieroglyph and the monument. “That, in 
brief, is the history of geometry and of every branch of science 
when it ceases to instruct or to delight”, as he asserts. (Diderot 
1999, 37)  If it does not fall in disuse, it goes from the status of 
a universal language to that of a metalanguage, raising only a 
limited number of questions and answering a very specific set of 
problems. Therefore, just a restricted number of specialists will 
cultivate it. That means that it is confined to become an 
auxiliary science of the new dominant scientific conception. 
 
4. A Metalanguage 
Commentators tend usually to override the consideration 
of such passage from a knowledge seen as universal to the status 
of a particular metalanguage. Nevertheless, it constitutes a key 
for the referred ambiguous relation that Diderot maintains with 
mathematics, the critique of which is, simultaneously, 
demolishing and supportive of the respective appreciation in 
certain domains. Two theses on the status of mathematics with a 
different reach support that position, both functioning as a kind 
of mainstay for subsequent arguments.  
The first assumes that mathematics are a type of formal 
language, more than a substantive knowledge of nature, hence 
they convert to metalanguage and not to metaknowledge, which 
entails immediate consequences about their importance. 
Moreover, as language, they remain attached to the function of 
translating a conception of reality built in the common 
interactions between subjects, mixing different factors, from the 
perceptive to the religious. 
The second stresses its idealistic feature, as 
mathematics deal with a “world purely of the intellect” (Diderot 
1999, 35) voided of rooting in the primary contact with 
materiality. The Letter on the Blind already suggested it, 
straight away on the sensorial basis. On the subject of 
Molyneux‟s problem, it set aside the existence of a direct 
intuition of ideas, namely of figure, to emphasize the centrality 
of reasoning by analogy in an experience that becomes 
constructed, as a complex process of constant learning. As he 
states, “during the first moments of sight we only receive a 
mass of confused sensations, which are only disentangled after 





a time and by a process of reflection. It is by experience alone 
that we learn to compare our sensations with what occasions 
them; that sensations having no essential resemblance with 
their objects, it is from experience that we are to inform 
ourselves concerning analogies which seem to be merely 
positive”. (Diderot 1999, 182)  
Diderot also pointed to it when inverting the 
conventional relation at the heart of Cartesianism between 
geometry and physics. Whereas, for Cartesians, physics became 
scientific as an application of mathematics, Diderot refers to 
the transition “from physics to geometry” (Diderot 1999, 168), 
thus signalling the anteriority of the contact with beings in 
their materiality on the most generic considerations, viz, 
geometrical qualities. In turn, that formality reveals the 
abstractive aspect that limits them, when it comes to 
enunciating concrete dimensions of reality. This perspective is 
patent in the example of Saunderson, a blind mathematician 
that, as such, “would infallibly have supposed a geometrical 
relation between the object and its use” (Diderot 1999, 188-189), 
but would not be able to deal with its ornamental features. 
  
5. A Science of Blind People? 
One tends to see in the centrality of the role played by 
Saunderson in the Letter, as well as on the praise of his 
capacity of teaching those who see better than a seeing person, 
a sort of recognition of the value of mathematics. However, we 
thus overlook the irony of the opposition between a science 
considered clear and distinct, and its privileged apprehension 
by a person born blind, in which Diderot still insists in the 
Addition to Letter on the Blind (1782). There, he writes that the 
blind Mélanie de Salignac “declared that geometry was the 
science of the blind, because it was of such universal application 
and no external aid was necessary to become proficient in it. 
“The geometrician”, she added, “spends nearly all his life with 
his eyes shut”“. (Diderot 1999, 197)  
Now, that suggestion of a constitutive blindness of 
mathematics, despite the recreational nature of the purpose, in 
fact resumes one main conclusion of the Letter. It corresponds 
to the same idea of their circumscription to a formalist 
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intellectualism, as they do not depend on the referential 
relation that impends, in so many aspects, on the vision. Again, 
this transpires from the words of Mademoiselle de Salignac: 
“One day I said to her, “Mademoiselle, imagine a cube.” – “I see 
it.” – “Place a point in the centre of the cube.” – “I have done so.” 
– “From the point draw straight lines to the angles; into what 
have you divided the cube?” – “Into six pyramids,” she replied 
without hesitation, “each having as its base one side of the cube, 
and a height equal to half its height.” – “True, but tell me where 
you see this?” – “In my head, as you do.”“ (Diderot 1999, 197)  
One could assume here an argument in favour of the 
common use of reason, if not for the distinction that appears in 
Thoughts as a decisive epistemological criterion to differentiate 
what constitutes an effective knowledge from a mere product of 
the thinking activity: “So long as something exists only in the 
mind, it remains there as an opinion, or a notion which may be 
either true or false, and which can be accepted or contradicted. 
It becomes meaningful only when linked to things which are 
external to it.” (Diderot 1999, 39) This condition, in which one 
foresees the opposition fixed by Kant between analytical and 
synthetic judgements, does not imply that mathematics do not 
allow us to access a certain type of knowledge about specific 
objects. However, the suspicion is launched over the validity of 
the certainty to which they lead. 
Whereas certainty raised, according to Descartes, from 
analytical purity, for Diderot the relation between 
mathematical reasoning and pure reason results mainly in 
language games pertaining both to the field of knowledge and 
to thought itself. Those need to submit to the proof of the real to 
acquire objectivity. Moreover, given that mathematical 
language games constitute a possible way to conceive and 
express the real, they lend themselves to comparison with other 
types of language, namely with the natural language. 
Concerning criteria such as expressiveness, translatability, 
representativeness, pertinence or universality, that the Letter 
on the Deaf and the Dumb (1751) introduce, Mathematics 
appear unsatisfactory, given the narrowness of their point of 
view, as well as the expected literality of their reasonings.  





Mathematics is considered therefore as a way of talking 
about an aspect of the real without exhausting the possible 
enunciations in relation to the multiplicity of the other aspects. 
Practicing such reductionism makes mathematicians proficient, 
but to pretend that it stands for the totality of the reality is 
their biggest mistake, as Diderot reminds us when blurring the 
boundaries between scientific clairvoyance and metaphysical 
obscurity: “There is perhaps one certain method of falling into 
error in metaphysics, and that is, not sufficiently to simplify the 
subject under investigation; and an infallible secret for 
obtaining incorrect results in applied mathematics is to suppose 
objects less compounded than they usually are.” (Diderot 1999, 
160) The Letter ends, thus, with a dramatic sequence around 
the extension of our ignorance, despite the apogee of the 
cultivation of mathematics: “For what do we know? What of the 
nature of matter? Nothing. What of the nature of spirit and 
thought? Still less. What of the nature of movement, space and 
duration? Absolutely nothing. What of the truths of geometry? 
Ask any honest mathematicians, and they will own to you that 
all their propositions are identical, and that so many volumes 
upon the circle (for example) are nothing but repetitions by a 
hundred different methods that it is a figure where all the lines 
drawn from the centre to the circumference are equal.” (Diderot 
1999, 190) 
 
6. An Exhausted Knowledge 
This idea that mathematics reached a point of 
saturation, merely hinted here, is clearly enunciated in 
Thoughts: “To judge from the inclination men‟s minds would 
appear to have for ethics, literature, natural history and 
experimental physics, I would almost go so far as to assert that, 
within the next hundred years, there will hardly be three great 
geometricians in Europe. This branch of science will just cease 
at the point where Bernouilli, Euler, Maupertuis, Clairaut, 
Fontaine and d‟Alembert have left it. It will stand like the Pillars 
of Hercules and no-one will pass beyond. Their works will endure 
in centuries to come, like the Egyptian pyramids, massive and 
laden with hieroglyphics, an awesome picture of the might and 
resources of the men who built them”. (Diderot 1999, 37) 
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Such a limit is assessed in this work, based on internal 
and external criteria of the scientific domain in question, once 
more framed by the idea of the recent occurrence of a scientific 
revolution. The first are summed up in the consideration that 
all the explanatory potentialities of such a science, under the 
terms enunciated by that science itself, are fulfilled. The 
outcome is verifiable, according to Diderot, by the differential 
calculation, the Newtonian explanation of the system of the 
universe or the transcendent geometry of D‟Alembert. Beyond 
those models, mathematics cannot advance without losing 
coherence or congruence. Thus, regardless of how we view their 
explanatory value - the object of the second series of arguments 
-, there remains the impossibility of progression, and therefore, 
if one decides to keep them as privileged language, or even as 
idealized conception of the world, one will be operating with a 
field already over determined, if not even definitively closed. 
Consequently, in case of the appearance of a new epistemological 
object, like the phenomenon of life, to which Diderot dedicated 
significantly D’Alembert’s Dream (1769), one faces a dilemma: 
either mathematics can be applied to it, which means that we 
are before a pseudo-new object, or they cannot be applied to it, 
which forces us to find another explanatory model. 
 
7. Conditions of Science 
This understanding is a consequence of Diderot‟s 
reinstatement of the knowledges to certain conceptions of the 
world, according both to historic contexts and to specific interests 
that are not always, nor everywhere, the same. Hence, all 
knowledge is affirmed subject to certain conditions that validate 
it. These do not result from a transcendent truth but from an 
intersubjective intertwining, between the meaning that the wise 
find there and the meaning that they can share with other men, 
in order to institute as the most adequate the reading of the real 
originated from that conception. Therefore, one science cannot 
become the definitive or exclusive knowledge, holder of the 
absolute truth, nor aspire to timelessness.  
The external criteria of validation are, consequently, as 
determinant as those designated as internal, since they are the 
ones deciding the pertinence of any knowledge for a society at a 





certain period. That articulation between a process of 
epistemological saturation and a progressive disinterest from 
the community characterizes both sides of the scientific 
revolution. To understand the historical dialectic of the sciences 
in this way depends on two profound changes in perspective.  
On one hand, the axiological criterion constituted by the 
idea of absolute, timeless and transcendent truth, assumed as 
the desire of knowledge, must see itself replaced by the one of 
utility, as is made explicit in Thoughts with the preview of a 
new scientific revolution: “It is also true that the idea of 
„usefulness‟ sets boundaries on everything. The criterion of 
usefulness is about to place limits on geometry, and in a few 
centuries from now, it will do the same for experimental 
science. I estimate that this field of study will last for some 
centuries yet, because it has an infinitely broader spectrum of 
use than any abstract science, and because it is indisputably 
the basis of everything we know for certain”. (Diderot 1999, 38) 
The Notice sur Clairaut insists in this social move: “It happens 
that taste turned towards useful things, and what is useful in 
geometry can be learned within six months, the remainder is 
mere curiosity”. (Diderot 1981, 404) 
This pragmatism replaces, thus, the image of scientific 
progress, as a cumulative line of successive approximations to a 
bigger truth, for one of a process animated by a functional logic, 
in which the evolution vector depends on the balance between 
theoretical developments, practical applications and social 
utility. No less meaningful is the fact that the emphasis placed 
on functionality guarantees both the reinstatement of science to 
the status of a product of men, thus limited by the constitutive 
elements of a pragmatic anthropology, and the effective 
historicity of the scheme of the revolutionary transits, that are 
not cyclical, nor related to any kind of providentialism. 
On the other hand, the theory of scientific revolutions 
presupposes the intersection of the variants of history with an 
epistemological perspectivism, one that implies the mutual 
dependency between the dominant scientific matrix and world 
conception, and, in that way, converts the science of a period 
into a certain way of examining reality. Therefore, it can never 
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offer itself as the only one, nor the exclusive, even at an 
eminent stage of achievement.  
 
8. Two Metaphysical Dimensions 
This relativism means that each epistemological model 
constitutes a way of conceiving reality, so that the 
corresponding axiomatic is not mere theoretical axioms, but in 
it we find diverse theses, and principles that express the 
underlying vision. Thus, all science contains a complex 
metaphysics, with two major zones. First, a general 
metaphysics, which includes the broad defining lines of the 
cosmovision serving as general framework of meaning and 
determining the common places of the proposed analyses, like 
the spiritualist or materialist perspective. Second, a particular 
metaphysics corresponding to the specific axiological choices 
that identify and legitimize their own way of scrutinising, as 
“everything has its metaphysic and its practice”. (Diderot 2007)  
An adequate reading of the scientific revolutions cannot but 
consider these two aspects, insofar as a revolution will 
differentiate itself from a simple reform given that both 
metaphysics must suffer a transformation together.  
Consequently, Diderot insists on the progressive loss of 
reach of the general metaphysics that sustains the choice of the 
particular metaphysics, which leads to the privileging of the 
mathematical language as ideal expression of the real. That 
allows him to establish that mathematics institute a certain 
interpretation of reality that depends on the acceptance of the 
quantitative point of view as the one that better represents it, 
and they are dominant if that explanatory principle is admitted 
as justified. They constitute, therefore, a particular vision of the 
sense of reality, even when they establish universal statements. 
Such property, insofar, depends of the set of choices, principles, 
axioms that allow one to think in terms of quantities. As Saint-
Amand reminds us, “it is also necessary to read all the debate 
on the qualitative and the quantitative in ideological terms. 
And, for that, we must go back to the very essence of 
mathematics. Because it is them that allow this desire for 
quantifiability that we find in physics”. (Saint-Amand 1984, 27, 
our translation) To circumscribe the apparent universal reach of 





mathematics, Diderot, then, presents the full argument by 
showing that their practice is reductive, their metaphysics is 
particular and, therefore, their utility becomes doubtful outside 
of those conditions and in face of the new interests, of the most 
recent research objects, and of the contemporary social patterns 
of well-being.  
To grasp the full reach of this critique, it is necessary 
first to think of utility in a double sense: as contribution to the 
progress of the living conditions of humanity and as 
contribution to the progress of knowledge. Thought XIX 
establishes a difference between direct utility, required by the 
common, and utility that allows the clarification of knowledge, 
which must be put in the service of understanding what fails in 
mathematics. Consequently, even if Diderot recognizes the 
argument according to which a whole technology ensues from 
them, he does not consider it enough reason to establish its 
utility. As he endorses: “Think of all the effort, work and time 
wasted on measurement which could have been spent on 
discovery!” (Diderot 1999, 69) That means that, for him, in what 
truly concerns humanity, whether from the point of view of 
improving the everyday, whether of its self-understanding, 
mathematics have a very limited reach. This arises from the fact 
that they suppose a double scale in the constitution of their 
objects, ensuing from the double metaphysics that they convoke. 
On one hand, they work with an object reduced to quantifiable 
attributes to guarantee the greatest degree of certainty. On the 
other hand, they presuppose incommensurable notions like those 
of theological order or divine reason.  
Therefore, they are not suited to account for nature, that 
is, for the reality that may interest the human race, “where 
what are taken for absolute truths cease entirely to be so when 
applied to the world we live in.” (Diderot 1999, 35) It was, in 
fact, what the Letter on the Blind already led to believe, against 
Descartes, who conceived the opposition between spirit and 
body from the substantial duality between thought and 
extension: “units pure and simple are too vague and general 
symbols for us. Our senses bring us back to symbols more 
suited to our comprehension and the conformation of our 
organs”. (Diderot 1999, 160) 




9. A Third Metaphysical Dimension 
But, in Thoughts, instead of returning to the argument 
about the limits of human reason, the author addresses the 
critique directly to the constitutive reductionism of 
mathematics that results from the epistemological choices of its 
fundamental metaphysics, according to which “bodies are 
stripped of their individual qualities”. (Diderot 1999, 36) 
Therefore, reasoning become circular, for being always the 
product of conventions, to the extent that “mathematician‟s 
ideas have no greater reality in nature than those of the 
gambler.” (Diderot 1999, 36)  
This predominance of form over content, asserting the 
sign as such, without the mandatory referential correlation, 
makes manifest that, after all, “their entire discipline was 
nothing more than metaphysics.” (Diderot 1999, 36) Hence, 
Diderot introduces a third connotation, now a pejorative one, 
for the term metaphysics, according to which a set of 
hypotheses unrelated to the reality of the experience is 
metaphysical, in the double meaning that it is beyond the 
experiential and, consequently, derives from an imaginative 
effort with which one replaces the experimented real with a 
fictional reality. To understand this properly, it is important to 
have in mind the distinction, generally verifiable, despite the 
terminological fluctuations of the authors‟ writing, between the 
hypothesis and the conjecture. In the first, echoing Newton, 
Diderot does not intend to trust, for being mere intellectual or 
opinionated exercise. By contrast, he considers conjectures vital 
to the interpretation of nature, for representing a theoretical 
possibility originated by experimental practice, which assumes 
the character of strong probability in the context of a proper 
experience of thought. 
Consequently, even if in this “thought” Diderot seems to 
have his eye on D‟Alembert‟s transcendent geometry, 
considering it affected, equally, by idealist generality, one 
should recognize that the central problem is of a broader kind, 
i.e. the epistemological object with which mathematics operate. 
Therefore, it is about a paradigmatic conflict between two 
conceptions of the real, separated by the discontinuity of an 





ongoing scientific revolution. That why a more advanced 
knowledge of one of the branches of mathematics, like integral 
calculation, is no longer satisfactory, as it follow the same logic 
of an already dated worldview. 
Thus, we understand better the reason why Diderot, 
refusing the solution of compromise between abstraction and 
experience, defended by D‟Alembert, in “Discours Préliminaire”, 
wrote: “This has led to the conclusion that it was the task of 
experimental philosophy to rectify geometrical calculations, and 
the logic of this view has been acknowledged by geometricians 
themselves. But what is the use of correcting geometrical 
calculations by experiment?”. (Diderot 1999, 36) That means: 
what is the use, if it is not about the same object, nor the same 
method, nor the same metaphysics? Given that what is at stake 
know is the knowledge of nature, whose characteristics – life, 
self-production, variability of forms, multiplicity of causes and 
effects, temporality – are opposed to those of the objects of 
mechanical physics based on geometry, where can be the 
compromise? 
It becomes once more noticeable that one of the keys to 
Diderot‟s radicalism in relation to mathematics is the amount 
of his epistemological concerns. This allows a better 
understanding of the dedication to young people, in which he 
declared the three fundamental theses that he intended to 
refuse: “Always bear in mind that nature is not God, that man 
is not a machine, that a hypothesis is not a fact.” (Diderot 1999, 
34) It consists in the difference between nature and universe, 
life and mechanism, as epistemological objects, and between 
hypothesis and fact, in what concerns methodology. These 
oppositions and the combinations that they admit must 
therefore figure as structural to the author‟s critique. 
 
10. A Hypothetical Science 
Summing up, Diderot accuses mathematical science of 
being completely dependent on a rational philosophy, with 
merely hypothetical content, due to three factors. First, its 
hypothetical-deductive progression forces it to proceed from an 
axiomatic basis that can only be formed by simple hypotheses, 
validated by reason, which, precisely, as hypotheses, are 
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neither facts, nor judgements founded or made upon facts. 
Second, its epistemological object is the result of a hypothetical 
reasoning over the adequation of the reduction of nature to 
geometry that never gets to happen in the effective experience 
of reality. Moreover, the presuppositions sustaining such 
narrowing, like that of the existence of a divine intelligence 
that would justify the universal order and knowledge in a 
macroscopic scale, are opposed to the very conditions of the 
scientific. Third, if we distance ourselves from their 
foundational idealism and we look for a knowledge of natural 
phenomena, we face unsurmountable anthropological and 
epistemological limits, which mathematical reasoning, in its 
internal activity, intends to bypass, but that it cannot expunge. 
 
11. A General Metaphysics 
The choice of Cartesianism as central interlocutor, seen 
as epitome of a vision of the world governed by the 
representation of mathematics, is obviously related to the critic 
of the general metaphysics in which they are supported. With 
said methodology, it is not a matter of reducing the modern to 
the cartesian mathematics, but of promoting the analogy 
between the justification scheme that the latter establishes and 
the one that is required by the very epistemological paradigm 
constituted by a mathematical apprehension of the real. To 
dismantle the model it becomes decisive to highlight that 
Cartesian science depends on the reinstatement of the model of 
the mathesis universalis to spiritualist metaphysics. 
In fact, it appears to Diderot that everything relevant in 
such epistemological model is of strictly intellectual 
jurisdiction. The knowable thus stays enclosed in the interiority 
of the thinkable or of the adequacy of the ideas of men to the 
ideas of God, in such a way that mathematics becomes 
dependent of that stable and universal order foreseen by the 
divinity. Thus, they cannot discard the metaphysical hypothesis 
of the existence of a God to give objectivity to ideas and to 
establish the adequation between the figures and the movements 
attributed to the beings and the beings as such. At the limit, the 
fable of the world would end up being nothing more than the 
deductive development of the metaphysical hypothesis of the 





universe as a plan of divine wisdom, despite Descartes‟ efforts to 
transform that hypothesis into scientific knowledge. 
It is not his atheism what Diderot interposes, prima 
facie, to reject said metaphysics, but his refusal of a pure 
intellectualism that forces the introduction of a superior 
intelligence to assure the existence of beings. This strategic 
option, setting him apart from other atheists like D‟Holbach, 
allows him to avoid all the issues around God‟s existence, even 
if these are manifestly implicated, or of being for or against 
such an order, while still providing enough indications on his 
position. God is thus turned into a metaphysical hypothesis 
ascribed to the options and the limits of mathematical reason, 
becoming dispensable for another scientific paradigm, namely, 
the one of an experimental physics with a programme that the 
Thoughts seek precisely to delineate.  
By deeming it hypothetic, the author suggests also that, 
scientifically, we do not have the conditions necessary to 
transform it into a factual judgement, unless we illegitimately 
replace physics with metaphysics. In this case, we produce a 
confusion between the regulating idea of nature‟s unity, that 
must assist knowledge, as a whole, and the idea of a creator 
and legislator God, that can only belong to the domain of 
theology. If the first, i.e. the presumption of “the chain that 
links phenomena together”, (Diderot 1999, 75) appears 
necessary for science to rise to the status of interpretation of 
nature, the second is a matter of faith, at the antipodes of the 
rational matrix of modern science.     
Still, for Diderot, the confusion between the two spheres, 
generating the hypothesis of an a priori intelligible order, 
originates a misunderstanding that ignores the specific focus of 
modern science. The latter, contrary to the old science, intends 
to explain nature by secondary, material and effective causes. 
However, as the author shows in Thought LVI, the will “to 
explain nature‟s purposes” (Diderot 1999, 71) keeps pushing 
through most of the systems. It is the case of the idea that 
science is committed to the intellectual intuition of fixed and 
eternal ideal natures, as of the conviction over the existence of a 
perfect legality produced by divine reason. The same applies to 
the postulate of a universal order, even if this introduces a 
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subtler, but no less present, version of finality, by way of the 
idea of an intelligent intentionality.  
Inspired by Buffon‟ distinction  between “why ?”, “how ?” 
and “how much? “ questions (Buffon 2007, 151), Diderot defends 
that “the empirical scientist, whose profession is to instruct and 
not to edify, will therefore stop asking why, and concern himself 
only with the question of how. The question of how is based on 
actual beings, and the question of why is merely a product of 
our minds.” (Diderot 1999, 72) The continuation, with the 
explicit mention of names such as Boërhave and Haller, clearly 
shows that he targets the fort of finalism that limits the 
scientific reach of mechanical explanations and does not 
prevent the permanent intrusion of the theological notion of a 
nature in a state of continuous miracle. 
 
12. A Bad Interpretation of Nature 
Thus, science, despite the efforts of its cultivators to 
follow objectivity patterns, assumes an inevitable dependency 
on the Apologetics that Diderot considers not only a false 
science but also a bad theology. As he asserts, “this way of 
interpreting nature is wrong, even in natural theology, as it 
substitutes human speculation for the workings of God, and 
binds the most important of truths to the fortunes of a 
hypothesis. But the most commonplace phenomenon will suffice 
to show how far the search for final causes is the opposite of 
true science”. (Diderot 1999, 71-72) 
The phenomenon chosen by Diderot – of the nature of 
milk – makes visible the multiplicity of reasons that turn the 
impasse of the finalist explanation into a central one. On one 
hand, by belonging to the life sciences, it allows reaching a 
triple objective: of contributing to the critique of science of the 
reasonable order; of evidencing that the emergent sciences are 
not sheltered by that fallacious procedure, but rather tend to 
perpetuate it; of introducing the difference between an 
explanation based on the issue of the destiny of a product that 
is kept in the sphere of finalism and one that addresses the 
process of formation by natural causation. On the other hand, 
because in being a metaphor of apologetics, that finds there the 
combination of utility and aesthetics manifesting the divine 





providence in the most banal things, it becomes ideal to show 
the opposite. Diderot counters it with the contingency of 
relatively sparse effects, like the fact that “there have been men 
who have made milk spurt from their breasts” or “that milk is 
the cause of the swelling of the breasts which sometimes 
inconveniences young girls when their periods are due.” 
(Diderot 1999, 72I ) 
The argument is reconstituted in two phases. First; if we 
know nothing and nothing can be known about a natural 
product as close to us as milk, what can be said of the more 
distant and complex finalities? Second: but if this ignorance is 
the epistemological and metaphysical condition of scientific 
practice, then science shall keep on being “ignorant”, obviating 
any relation with apologetics concerns. Conclusion: in the 
equations of science there is no place for the introduction of the 
constant of God, neither for its conversion into a variable, 
because, instead of what the conception of mathematics 
supposes, it forms an epistemological obstacle to sensible 
scientific practice. It is, therefore, a science without the idea of 
God and others notions that derive from it – creation, absolute 
order, providence, finality, homology between divine reason and 
human reason – that must be built, unless, with the hat of 
science, one intends to do bad metaphysics or bad theology. 
 
13. Some Variants 
The virulence of the critique, however, does not imply 
the rejection, pure and simple, of the mathematical analysis, 
neither of the potentialities inherent in such language. Of 
course, for instance, physics cannot do without mathematics. 
Similarly, they are necessary for the formation of citizens tuned 
with the modern enlightened worldview. 
 The “Project for a University” send to the Russian 
Empress Catherine II in 1775, attributes to the elementary 
learning of arithmetic, algebra, calculation of probabilities and 
geometry the power of contributing to “rectify men‟s minds, by 
furnishing them with models of reasoning according to the 
strictest evidence and the most rigorous truth”. (Diderot 1995, 
436, our translation) Diderot claims that they help to enhance 
judgement according to logic principles, to cherish order, to 
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assume demonstration as the pattern of all reasoning, to lead to 
invention, and to reduce the vulnerability to superstition. 
(Diderot 1999, 436-437) They figure therefore at the very 
beginning of the curriculum, considered as a more available 
language for young children to learn, instead of the traditional 
reading and writing. The praise of their pedagogical virtues 
nevertheless does not interfere with the critique carried out, as 
it is mostly concerned with making the best of the evidence that 
“one counts everything, one measures everything. The use of 
our reason is often a rule of three”. (Diderot 1999, 435) The 
perspective of an ongoing scientific revolution keeps intact for, 
as Diderot puts it, “if one thinks that the method of geometers 
cannot be applied to everything, one is mistaken, If one 
considers that it should not be applied to everything, one is 
right”. (Diderot 1999, 436-437) That means that mathematics, 
being at the basis of modern science, became elementary, but no 
longer corresponds to a cutting-edge science. Consequently, this 
draft constitutes one good example of their assignment to 
specific uses and purposes, far from any late attempt to 
reassess the convictions of an early age.  
Then, it is subject to the criterion of usefulness and free 
from spurious connexions, that mathematics assumes a specific 
place, with particular functions, in relation to concrete 
problems, that are of a mathematical nature. 
In the Letter on Blind People, Diderot acknowledges the 
mathematical core of Molyneux‟s Problem. Therefore, even if he 
deals with it also in terms of sensitive representation, organic 
competence and education, he suggests that it is up to the 
geometer to lead the search of a proper solution. This is because 
the geometer “knows that what defines a square are its 
mathematical properties. That‟s why he is able to establish the 
relationship between sensitive data and mathematical idea and 
to operate the translation of one sense into another”. (Duflo 
2013, 148, our translation) Nevertheless, as we see it, this 
accuracy does not dispel the critical intent on the reach of 
mathematical explanation, but in a certain way reinforces it, by 
being assessed in the mastering of its own logic.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
In Thoughts, for example, the philosopher follows a 
mathematical approach to speculate on the aggregation of the 





elements into molecules that are composed of and coordinated 
in more complex systems, from the geometric theory of the 
resultant forces of the “vibration of an elastic body under 
impact.” (Diderot 1999, 56) That explanation is the result of 
reasoning by abduction, as the conjecture transposes the most 
recent researches in the domain of mathematics on a specific 
problem originated in the natural sciences. It makes an 
oriented use that submits mathematics to the new 
epistemological paradigm. 
The same occurs in the 1770 booklet, titled “Principes 
philosophiques sur la matière et le mouvement”. There, Diderot 
discusses the concepts of body, movement, intrinsic and 
extrinsic force, inertia, weight, but subverts its conventional 
sense with the aim of introducing the general alternative of a 
universal driving force: “What is very certain is that all bodies 
gravitate upon each other, is that all particles of bodies 
gravitate upon each other, is that, in this universe, all is in 
translation or in effort [in nisu], or in translation and in effort 
[in nisu] at the same time.” (Diderot 1975, 681, our translation) 
Hence, the possibility of a mathematical explanation appears 
after the modelling of the theme from other knowledges and not 
as first or exclusive explanation. 
Despite the relevance conferred in this text to 
mathematical treatment, required by the analysis of the 
universal properties of matter, Diderot does not stop insisting 
on its subsidiary function. Presenting himself as a physician 
and a chemist, concerned with bodies in their materiality, he 
claims that geometry and metaphysics should be done by 
others. This means that, because of the scientific revolution, “it 
is required a global modification of the concepts, that accounts 
for the change of paradigm in the interpretation of nature”. 
(Duflo 2013, 183, our translation) Henceforth, central terms like 
those of matter and movement correspond to other contents and 
functions, such as the explanation of complex body formation 
from elementary particles or the justification of the forms thus 
reached, despite the simplicity of the start-up process.  
It remains what would have been, in 1761, a revaluing of 
mathematics, when controverting with D‟Alembert, in Sur deux 
mémoires de D’Alembert, he defended the explanatory role of 
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the calculation of probabilities. Seeing it as a “mathematical 
physics of life” (Diderot 1975, 341, our translation), the author 
seemed to suggest a strong change of opinion on the role of 
mathematics, if not the abandonment of the idea of a scientific 
revolution. That is not so, as can be deduced from the 
concluding remarks to the Mémoires. There Diderot introduces 
a significant distinction that shows what he understands by the 
physical-mathematic approach: “the analysis of probabilities 
can be considered as an abstract science or as a physical-
mathematic science. Under the first aspect, problems are solved 
in the geometer‟s mind, as they would be solved in divine 
understanding. […] Under the second aspect, it is a science 
limited to small means, to the experience of a moment, to a 
being that go like a lightning and that relates everything to its 
duration”. (Diderot 1975) Adopting this second point of view 
implies, therefore, a completely different way of formulating the 
problems. Instead of considering in a generic perspective, “men, 
and an uninterrupted game and an endless life”, one shall ask: 
“Pierre and Jacques (two men) commit themselves to play 
throughout their lives, that game and under those conditions: 
which should be their bets?” (Diderot 1975) Once more, it is not 
up to the science of nature to follow mathematical intellectual 
reasoning but the opposite. Four years later, in the article 
“Jouer” of Encyclopaedia, he will summarize the essay and 
drew a revealing conclusion: “I hear that, whatever affinity 
there may be between the functions of the geometer and those 
of the player, it is equally rare to see good geometers that are 
great players, and great players that are good geometers”. 
(ibid., our translation)  
Actually, Diderot uses the study of this branch of 
mathematics, beyond the multiple pragmatic applications, 
mainly to validate the materialist hypothesis, inspired by 
ancient Epicureanism, of the production of order as an effect of 
chance. Therefore, it is about an experience of thought that the 
calculation of probabilities helps to substantiate. Its 
contribution consists in showing that the analogy between the 
idea of a multiplicity of favourable conditions, in a minimum 
duration to the production of a chance interval, with the 
representation of the ontological opportunity of an event, like in 





a game of dice, is viable. However, Diderot shows himself to be 
aware that this idea does not overcome moral certainty, that is, 
the degree of adequation regarding the level of calculation, in 
terms of hypothesis and not of factual description. 
Being a question of analysing the variables, it does not 
allow us to form a metaphysical theory on the need, by 
associating this calculation with the differential calculation. On 
the contrary, its interest is proportional to the impossibility of 
converting it into a factual explanation and to the way in which 
it empowers a gnoseological and ontological perspectivism, 
giving us opportunity to think, from within mathematics 
themselves, of the prevalence of the contingent, the probable, 
the approximate, the phenomenal, the temporal, the 
unfinished, that is, of a set of values totally opposed to the ones 
of metaphysical mathematics.  
In this sense, the probabilistic calculation does not 
reinforce or redeem the mathematical vision but ends up 
favouring its respective deconstruction. The calculation of 
probabilities accomplishes, accordingly, an epistemological 
function, by confirming the perspective of a nature in 
transformation, whose laws are not definitely fixed, but keep up 
with a continuous and exuberant process of morphogenesis. It 
is, therefore, from the new scientific paradigm that Diderot 
resumes the calculation of probabilities, taking advantage of 
the respective analytical functions to add to the consistency of 
the materialist hypothesis of a nature that operates on its own, 
without God or a superior intelligence. As summarized by Jean-
Paul Jouary: “The interest, for Diderot, is to show that 
mathematics, far from leading to the thesis of an eternal order 
of nature, tend rather to show that nature has a history in the 
course of which there is a real creativity, without us needing to 
request some finality, let alone a God geometer creator.” (Jouary 
2011, 74, our translation) In the end, this leads necessarily to 
the idea that the scientific revolution is goes together with a 
philosophical revolution.   
 
14. Present 
The actuality of Diderot‟s claims is undeniable. From the 
multidimensional reading of the processes that lay at the origin 
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of the revolutionary impetus, which combines historical, social 
and epistemological aspects, the philosopher anticipates not only 
the contemporary ideation of scientific revolution as paradigm 
shift, but of some contents of that vision developed more recently 
by Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. This 
is the case of the decisive role of history in scientific knowledge, 
the play between stability of the paradigmatic structure, in the 
stage of normal science, and the arbitrariness of the transition 
between paradigms, or the correlation between scientific 
practices and metaphysical orientations.  
Such line of thought around the discontinuities of the 
history of sciences keeps on fulfilling an interpellator function 
concerning the rooted convictions on the singularity of the 
coeval scientific model, the inevitability of a dominance of 
mathematics and the obvious character of the relation that 
these hold with the truth. Given a generalised tendency to 
reconduct epistemology to a set of substantive questions, 
perspectivist pragmatism, ensuing from the idea of scientific 
revolution, forces the reflection over the concrete conditions of 
science, the way it relies on some narrative traits, as well as 
over the fundamental options that each of its versions depends 
on. This way, an unfoldment is introduced between what in 
scientific practice concerns the belief system over the truthful 
and what results from its cultural dimension. This duality does 
not represent a choice between two opposed possibilities, but a 
dialectics between two complementary orientations, that ends up 
caught by the perception of science as a cultural phenomenon.  
In the case of mathematics, it leads, also, to the 
recognition of the possibility of conceiving alternative visions, in 
which their cultivation would be subsidiary, destined to make 
manifest the form of reductionism that, inevitably, constitutes 
them and makes them, simultaneously, extremely effective. 
Diderot‟s assertion of the three levels of metaphysics involved 
in mathematics also induces the need to ponder the correlation 
between the mathematised worldview of nature and the belief 
in a spiritualist order based on the government of a superior 
intelligence. Despite the diffused laicization, accelerated in the 
second half of the past century, with a justification that tends 
to go through the profanatory effects of science, it makes us 





wonder whether the metaphysical conviction that mathematics 
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